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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 7, 1998, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District,
affirmed a decision of the Illinois Commerce Commission
(Commission) by holding that the Commission acted within its lawful
authority in reviewing and denying the application of Lakehead Pipe
Line company (Lakehead) for a certificate in good standing under
section 401 of the Illinois Pipeline Law (Pipeline Law).I The court held
that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Commission of the
Pipeline Law was reasonable and did not conflict with the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.2 The primary issue in the case
was whether Lakehead would be granted eminent domain authority.3
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lakehead, a limited partnership, owns the United States portion
of the longest liquid petroleum pipeline in the world, along with its
Canadian affiliate, Interprovincial Pipe Line, Inc. (IPL).4 Lakehead and
'Juris Doctorate Candidate May, 1998, Loyola University Chicago, School of Law.
'Lakehead Pipeline Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 1998 WL 162338
(Ill.App. 3 Dist.); (citing 220 ILCS 5/15-100 et seq (West 1996)).
2Lakehead at *1; (citing U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, section 3).
3Return to the Commission would have been required to actually exercise Eminent
domain power. However, upon return to Commission's approval would be a mere formality
concurring opinion of Chairman Pan Miller, p. 3. n. 1, Lakehead opinion Nos. 96-01415.4Id.
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IPL transport crude petroleum from the Northwest Territories and the
Canadian Provinces of Alberta, to petroleum refineries in the Provinces
of Ontario and Quebec as well as in the Midwest United States.5 The
116.64 mile portion of this pipeline that lies within Illinois became
active in 1969, and is referred to as Line 6A.6 When Line 6A was
originally constructed, it did not require the use of eminent domain;
rather, the land was acquired upon general rights-of-way from public
utilities, as well as from easements and fee interest purchased by
Lakehead from private landowners.7
Lakehead initiated an expansion program, System Expansion
Program II, which calls for an increased transportation of crude oil by
Lakehead and IPL to and through Illinois, and included the addition of
new pumping stations to Line 6A.' When Lakehead determined that
the capacity of Line 6A had been reached, resulting in rationing during
peak periods, Lakehead proposed the construction of a new pipeline,
which it referred to as Line 14.9 According to Lakehead, the additional
route, the estimated cost of which is $300 million, would be desirable
because of the significant amount of development in the municipalities
along Line 6A since 1969.0 In addition, the route for proposed Line 14
would travel primarily through rural and agricultural areas."1 Prior to
construction of the new proposed pipe line for the transport of crude
petroleum, Lakehead sought the issuance of a certificate in good
standing under section 401 of the Pipeline Law, as the first step toward
acquiring eminent domain authority.' 2 Lakehead emphasized its intent
to negotiate with landowners and municipalities along the proposed
route, but warned that it may eventually need condemnation authority
in order to achieve its ultimate goal. 3
Following an extended hearing held before a Commission
hearing examiner, at which numerous witnesses and exhibits were
3Id.
61d.
7 d.
sd.
9 d.
'
0Lakehead at * 1.
"Id
"
2Lakehead at *2.
3Lakehead at * 1-2.
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presented.'4 However, the the Commission rejected the examiner's
recommendation and determined that Lakehead failed to demonstrate
a public need for a new proposed pipe line, stating that public need
must be determined by looking to the demand for refined petroleum
products, not only crude oil, specifically.15 The test for public need,
according to the Commission, is met by examining the need of the
public at large, not by looking at the needs of any individual or number
of individuals.' 6 The Commission found that Lakehead failed establish
a public need for Line 14 because there was no support to the claim that
Line 14 would have a positive price effect on the market for refined
petroleum products, and it was evident that the public did not lack an
adequate supply of refined petroleum at a reasonable cost. 17
Lakehead's application for a certificate of good standing under section
401 of the Pipeline Law was denied, and Lakehead appealed,
accompanied by amicus curiae briefs from numerous oil and pipeline
companies and other organizations. 8
III. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT
The Illinois Appellate Court, considered four issues: (1) whether
the Commission acted within its authority; (2) whether the state or
federal constitution prohibits the action of the Commission in this case;
(3) whether the decision by the Commission to deny Lakehead's
application was supported by substantial evidence; and (4) whether
there were adequate findings made to support the Commission's
decision. 9 The burden of proof in this case rests with the appellant on
each issue.2°
4The hearing examiner determined that public need had been demonstrated by
reference to the need and demand for more capacity on Lakehead's system.
'
5Lakehead at *2-3.
16Lakehead at *3.
17A Nobel laureate testified that any barrel of oil shipped via the proposed line would
simply displace crude oil which arrives from other points on the line. The only benefit it
would give Lakeland was greater market share: the price of crude oil would be unaffected.
18 d.
"'Id. (Citing Citizens United For Responsible Energy Development, Inc. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 285 Ill.App.3d 82, 673 N.E.2d 1159 (1996)).201d. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d) (West 1996); United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 163 Ill.2d 1, 643 N.E.2d 719 (1994).
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A. Scope of Commission Authority
The Commission, in exercising its authority, interpreted section
401(b) of the Pipeline Law as requiring a determination of whether
Lakehead met the statute's requirements, including the requirement that
there be a public need for Line 14.21 Lakehead argued that the
Commission's authority is limited in interstate pipeline cases to an
exercise of "prudential control" over certification applications (which
does not include the right to determine whether there is a need for Line
14) because the Commission may not regulate the interstate markets
involving transportation by common carriers.22 However, the court
found that the plain language of section 401(b) instructs the
Commission, when reviewing certification applications, to determine
if a public need exists and whether necessity requires the proposed
service." Section 401(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) Requirements for issuance. The Commission, after
a hearing, shall grant an application for a certificate
authorizing operations as a common carrier by pipeline,
in whole or in part, to the extent that it finds that the
application was properly filed; a public need for the
service exists; the applicant is fit, willing, and able to
provide the service in compliance with this Act,
Comission regulations, and orders; and the public
convenience and necessity requires isuance of the
certificate."24
Despite the clear legislative language, Lakehead insists, relying on the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Service Pipe Line Co. v. Ruder,25
that this directive of section 401 (b) not only causes the Commission to
exceed its lawful authority in interstate commerce cases, but also places
an undue burden upon such commerce.26
2
'Lakehead at *3.221d.
2 1d. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/15-401(b) (West 1996)).
24 d. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/15-401(b) (West 1996)).
2519 I11 2d 332, 167 N.E. 2d 419 (1960).
261d (Citing Service Pipe Line Co. v. Ruder, 19 I11.2d 332, 167 N.E.2d 419 (1960)).
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1. The Ruder Decision
In Ruder, a case in which an interstate pipeline brought a
condemnation action without first applying to the Commission for
approval, the court concluded that, unless preempted by the Federal
government, State law governs certification, which is a crucial first step
in obtaining eminent domain authority.27 The Ruder court held that,
because federal legislation had not entirely preempted the State's
authority to regulate certification applications, a State had the authority
to exercise "prudential control" over the interstate activities of a utility
which may implicate eminent domain authority.28
Lakehead also argued that case law decided since the Ruder
decision allowed the Commission to exceed the prudential control
established in Ruder.29 However, the court found section 401 of the
Pipeline Law does not permit the Commission to exercise more than
prudential control since it is sole authority in supervising and protecting
the welfare of the public in matters of public utilities.3 °  The
Commission does not determine whether the pipe line should enter the
market, Lakeland is free to build a pipeline without Eminent domain
authority. Therefore, in accordance with section 401, the Commission
must make a determination as to whether Lakehead may acquire
certification for its proposed project, which would provide for the
potential acquisition of condemnation authority in the future.3'
2. Interstate Commerce
Lakehead, along with amici, maintain that the requirement to
demonstrate public need pursuant to section 401 (b) of the Pipeline Law,
places an undue burden and discriminates against interstate
27Lakehead at *3-4. (Citing Ruder, 19 Ill.2d at 335).28 d. at *4. (Citing Ruder, 19 Ill.2d at 335).291d. at *4.
301d.
3 1The Court notes that it does not make a determination, per se, about whether
Lakehead's proposed pipeline should enter the market. In fact, the court concedes that
Lakehead could build its proposed pipeline 6A, without acquiring certification; however, in
doing so, Lakehead would have no condemnation authority should the need arise, nor would
it have the ability to seek such authority. Id.
XVIII Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 132
commerce.32  While the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution provides Congress with the broad authority to "regulate
commerce...among the several states," it does not eliminate the power
of the states to regulate significant local issues.33 In the absence of
federal regulation, states and local governments may regulate even
issues that implicate interstate commerce that fall within their general
police power, as long as the regulation does not conflict with the notion
of free trade among the states or serve to isolate the state by virtue of
the statute's economic protection. 34 The Illinois Supreme Court has
held that a state regulation which affects interstate commerce is
permissible where: (1) the statute regulates in a consistent, non-
arbitrary manner in order to fulfill a legitimate local public interest; (2)
the effects of the statute on interstate commerce are only incidental; and
(3) the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly not excessive
in relation to the local benefit. 3
In Lakehead, the court found that the burden on interstate
commerce was not excessive (if at all) in weighing the State's interest
in regulating condemnation authority against Lakehead's potential use
of condemnation authority in order to carry out its proposal for
supplying greater amounts of petroleum.36 The court held that section
401(b) of the Pipeline Law is not a restriction of any federal regulation,
nor does it impair interstate traffic; rather, it is merely a regulation on
the use of the State's sovereign power.37 The Lakehead court concluded
that the State is not obligated to issue condemnation authority, and
without any federal legislation, the issuance of such authority is
discretionary; therefore, absent proof that the requirements of the
32 1d.
33Id(Citing Retail Clerks International Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 84 S.Ct.
219 (1963); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S.Ct. 930 (1941)).
34Id at *4-5. (Citing Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 100 S.Ct.
2009 (1980); Edward R. Bacon Grain Co. v. City of Chicago, 325 IIl.App. 245, 59 N.E.2d 689
(1945); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, (1959); Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,454, 112 S.Ct. 789, 800 (1992); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 55 S.Ct. 497 (1935)).35Idat *5. (Citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847
(1970)). 361d. at *5.
371d. at *5. (Citing Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. State, 712 P.2d 40
(Sup.Ct.Okl. 1985)).
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Pipeline Law have been met, the Commission may properly deny an
application for certification as well as condemnation authority."a
B. Commission Interpretation of Section 401
Lakehead, along with amici, also argue that the Commission
erroneously interpreted section 401 (b) of the PipeLine Law by adopting
a definition for "public need" which was unsupported by any case
authority, and even ignored prior decisions.3 ' Lakehead claims that this
definition created an insurmountable burden for its certification
application, resulting in an unfair denial. However, the court examined
the intent and history of the legislature, considering the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statute's language within the context of its
stated purpose. 40 Based on this examination, particularly the changes
made to the Pipeline Law in 1986 and 1996, the court concluded that
the legislature intended to change the law with respect to certifying
pipelines by raising the requirements for certification.4 In addition, the
court found that the absence of an express statutory definition of public
need indicated the legislative intent to provide the Commission with the
flexibility and discretion of defining public need in specific, individual
cases.
42
Lakehead and amici argue further, however, that the
Commission's approach to reviewing their certification application is
38Lakehead also argued that section 401(b) of the Pipeline Law, as interpreted by the
Commission, discriminates against interstate commerce because of the requirement that
Lakehead demonstrate a public need for the proposed pipeline. The Lakehead court found that
a requirement of proof of a local public need would, in fact violate the Commerce Clause;
however, a showing of a local public need is only one way of proving need in accordance with
the statute, and the Commission also considered interstate necessity in reviewing Lakehead's
application. Therefore, the court found no constitutional violation in the Commission's review
and subsequent denial of Lakehead's application. Id at *5. (Citing St. Louis Connecting R.I
Co. v. Blumberg, 325 III. 387, 394, 156 N.E. 298, 301 (1927); Kern River Gas Transmission
Co. v. Clark County, Nevada, 757 F.Supp. 1110 (D.Nev.1990)).
191d at *5.401d. at *5. (Citing Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 1Il.2d 445, 451, 687
N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (1997); Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 282
I;;.App.3d 672, 676, 669 N.E.2d 628,630-31 (1996)).4
'Id. at *7. (Citing Freight Forwarders Institute v. United States, 409 F.Supp.693
(N.D.I1I.1976); Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 IlI.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198 (1977)).
42Id. at *7. (Citing Freight Forwarders Institute v. United States, 409 F.Supp.693
(N.D.IlI.1976); Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 IIl.App.3d 545, 370 N.E.2d 1198 (1977)).
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erroneous because it fails to make proper considerations when
determining if there is a public need for proposed Line 14.4' The court
agreed with the reasoning of the Commission, which considered the
convenience and necessity of the pubic as a whole, and not any
individuals or number of individuals.4 The Commission determined
that, in this case, the need of the public is greater than that of a limited
number of market players because the definition of a public need cannot
be based only on a limited number of priate interests.45
Lakehead also argued that the Commission erroneously
construed the notion of a "need," claiming that the Commission's
decision ultimately results in a requirement that there be a critical or
absolute need for a service; however, the court found that the
Commission's decision describes its rationale which determines
whether there is a present need by looking for evidence of a current, or
foreseeable future desire or demand by the public. 46
Finally, Lakehead claims that the Commission's approach was
an arbitrary abandonment of previous precedent.47 The court, however,
found that while reviewing courts must give Commission decisions
significant deference, the Commission is not a judical body, and its
orders are not subject to res judicata; therefore, a regulatory body, such
as the Illinois Commerce Commission, must have the authority to
address each case before it individually, regardless of whether the case
involves an issue already decided upon by the Commission.48
Consequently, the court found that the Commission's decision was
431Id. at *7.
44Mid. at *7. (Citing Roy v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 322 111.452, 458, 153 N.E.
648, 648 (1926)).4
'Lakehead argued that the Commission misinterpreted the requirement of public
need by excluding business and industrial interests since businesses as well as the industrial
arena as a whole are part of the public; however, the court found that in the context of public
need, the appropriate inquiry is whether the larger group of the general public requires a
service, not whether some individual component(s) of the public could use the service. Id. at
*9. (Citing Roy, 322 I11. at 458.)
46Id. at * 8.
47Id. at *8.
4"dat *8. (Citing United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 163 Il.2d
1, 12, 643 N.E.2d 719, 725 (1994); village of Apple River v. Illinois Commerce Com'n, 18
I;;.2d 518, 523, 165 N.E.2d 329, 332 (1960); Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, --- Iil.App.3d ---, 687 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (1997); Mississippi River Fuel
Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 1 Il.2d 509, 116 N.E.2d 394 (1953)).
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reasonable, and did not constitute an arbitrary abandonment of its prior
decisions.49
C. Substantial Evidence and Adequate Findings
Lakehead also argued that the Commission's decision was not
supported by substantial evidence; however, on appeal, Commission's
findings are considered to constitute a true prima facie case.5° The
court stated, based on the fact that the Commission's decision may only
be reversed if the appellant clearly demonstrates that its findings are not
supported by substantial evidence from an examination of the entire
record, that Lakehead failed to demonstrate a public need for its
proposed Line 14 as opposed to a private need or expectation; therefore,
the court found that the Commission's decision was supported by
substantial evidence appearing in the record.51
Lakehead also argued that the Commission's decision failed to
provide adequate findings; however, as the court stated, the
Commission is not required to provide findings on each evidentiary
issue.52 Decisions of the Commission are statutorily sufficient if they
enable the court to make an informed and intelligent review of the
order.53 The court stated that the Commission thoroughly discussed its
findings by frequently citing to the record, by summarizing the
arguments and evidence presented, and by clearly articulating its
approach to reviewing Lakehead's application.54
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District,
49Id. at *8.
50 d. at *9. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/10-201(d) (West 1996); People exrel. Hartigan v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 148 Ill.2d 348, 592 N.E.2d 1066 (1992)).
5 Id. at *9. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/10-201(e)(iv)(A) (West 1996); Continental Mobile
Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 269 I1. App.3d 161, 645 N.E.2d 516 (1994)).
521d. at *9. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/10-201(e)(iii) (West 1996); City of Chicago v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 281 Ill. App..3d 617, 666 N.E.2d 1212 (1996)).
"Id. at *9. (Citing 220 ILCS 5/10-201(e)(iii) (West 1996); City of Chicago v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 281 II1. App..3d 617, 666 N.E.2d 1212 (1996)).
14Id. at *10
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holding that the Illinois Commerce Commission did not exceed its
authority in its interpretation of the Illinois Pipeline Law when it denied
Lakehead's application for certification, is significant precedent
because the decision clarifies the scope of authority granted to the
Illinois Commerce Commission." The court found that the decision of
the Commission was not prohibited by either the state or the federal
constitution, and also established guidelines to accompany its holdings
that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence
as well as adequate findings. The Illinois Appellate Court addressed in
this case the authority of an administrative entity to regulate an area
closely related to the protection accorded under the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution, findings that there was no
constitutional conflict in the Commission's exercise of its regulatory
authority over the potential use of the condemnation authority.56 The
decision effectively expands the authority of the Commission as an
Administrative Law entity over the interstate activities of a utility, and
presumably broadens its authority in its general adjudication capacity.
55 d. at * 1.
16Id. at * 1.
